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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ST. GEORGE THRIFT AND LOAN,
Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

]
)>

RAYMOND L. LOWE,
Defendant,
RAYMOND L. LOWE,

Case No. 920852CA

]
]1

Third-Party Plaintiff,
and Appellee,

Priority 15

]

vs.
GREGORY A. KNOX,
Third-Party Defendant,
and Appellant.

]

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the above-entitled Court by
provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(k), U.C.A., 1953 as amended.
NATURE OF CASE
Appellee initiated this action as a third-party complaint against Appellant
seeking recovery of a deficiency remaining following the nonjudicial foreclosure of a trust
1

deed. The Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Washington County, State of Utah, the
honorable James L. Shumate presiding, granted Appellee summary judgment and Appellant
brings this appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Has Appellant alleged a meritorious claim of innocent misrepresentation?
2. Did Appellant raise any genuine issue of material fact in resisting
Appellant's motion for summary judgment?
3. Is Appellant's claim for innocent misrepresentation barred by operation of
U.C.A. §78-12-26(3).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there were no
genuine issues of material fact, the appellate court views the facts and all reasonable
inferences in a light most favorable to the party opposing a motion for summary judgment.
It reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness without any deference to the
trial court. Neiderhauser Builders v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of all relevant materials is quoted in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the sake of clarity, the Third-Party Plaintiff and Appellee will be referred
to as "Lowe" and the Third-Party Defendant and Appellant will be referred to as "Knox".
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On April 2, 1986, Lowe as seller and Knox as purchaser entered into a
contract for the purchase of a certain residence located in St. George. The agreed purchase
price was $69,900. (R 23-24, 55-56, 75-81) In connection therewith, Knox executed a trust
deed note in the amount of $68,900. (R 24, 55-56, 75-81) The trust deed note was thereafter
assigned to St. George Thrift and Loan for the purpose of securing an obligation which
Lowe owed that institution. (R 24, 55-58, 75-81)
Immediately after his purchase, Knox hired an independent appraiser by the
name of C. G. Miller who opined that the subject property would be worth $69,500 upon
the completion of certain improvements costing between $3,000 and $5,000. Miller provided
his opinion by way of a letter to Knox dated May 1, 1986. (R 215-218, 220, 252). Miller's
letter included the following statement: "A fully documented report will not be presented
at this time, but is available upon request. This report would include comparables, a site
plan, dimensions, etc." (R 252)
After receiving Miller's report, Knox concluded that, given the terms which
Lowe had afforded him in the purchase of the property, he had purchased the property at
a fair price. (R 213, 217, 234-235)
Thereafter, Knox defaulted in the payment of the subject obligation and St.
George Thrift and Loan, through regular non-judicial proceedings, foreclosed the subject
trust deed at a sale which was conducted on October 8, 1991. (R 24-26, 55-58, 75-81) The
foreclosure resulted in a $25,987 deficiency, the rights to which St. George Thrift and Loan
later assigned to Lowe. (R 25-26, 55-58, 75-81) Lowe then initiated this action against Knox
to recover the deficiency. (R 24-26)
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Knox filed his answer and counterclaim on March 2, 1992. (R 55-58) Knox'
only defense was based upon his allegation that Lowe had defrauded him in the purchase
of the residence. Knox alleged that he had agreed to pay $17,900 more for the subject
residence than it was worth because Lowe had refused to allow Knox the opportunity of
having the property appraised prior to closing. (R 55-58, 75-81)
Knox contends that in the Spring of 1991, he became aware of information
suggesting that the subject property had been worth only approximately $52,000 on the date
he purchased the property from Lowe. (R 55, 76, 78, 153, 223-226)
In his deposition, Knox conceded that in negotiating the sale of the property,
Lowe had never made any statement about the appraised value of the property but had
merely advised Knox of Lowe's asking price. (R 206-207) Knox contended that in offering
the property for sale at the stated price, Lowe impliedlv represented that price to be the fair
market value of the property.
Upon Lowe's motion for summary judgment the district court concluded that
the statute of limitations commenced to run against Knox' claim of misrepresentation when
Knox received Miller's letter of opinion and that Knox' claim has therefore barred by
operation of U.C.A. §78-12-26(3). (R 162-169)

Accordingly, the district court entered

judgment in favor of Lowe and dismissed Knox' counterclaim. (R 171-173)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
While Knox attempts to allege a claim of innocent misrepresentation, he fails
to make any showing that Lowe in fact made any representation. Furthermore, to the extent
that any statement by Lowe could be construed as a representation, such representation is
4

nothing more than an opinion regarding the value of the subject property and not actionable.
In resisting Lowe's motion for summary judgment, Knox failed to present any
evidence regarding the fair market value of the subject residence on the date of the sale.
Accordingly, the district court could have reached the same result on procedural grounds.
Finally, Knox' claim for innocent misrepresentation is barred by operation of
the statute of limitations. The three-year period under U.C.A. §78-12-26(3) began to run
in May 1986 when Knox' agent concluded his investigation and provided Knox with his
opinion regarding the value of the property.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
KNOX' CLAIM OF INNOCENT MISREPRESENTATION MUST
FAIL ON THE MERITS.
This Court may affirm if the district court's decision can be sustained on any
proper legal basis. See Weber v. Snyderville West, 800 P.2d 316 (Utah App 1990), cert.
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
The district court could have reached the same result applying any one of
several legal theories. Accordingly, this Court may consider the other arguments which
Lowe advanced in connection with his motion for summary judgment.

The Elements of Misrepresentation
The elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim are:
(1) That a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or
5

(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the
other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8)
and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. See Pace v. Parish. 122 Utah
141, 247 P.2d 273, 274-275 (1952).
In his brief Knox refers to his theory of the case as "fraud in the form of
innocent misrepresentation. . . ." (Appellant's Brief at 3) Indeed, Knox apparently now
concedes that he is not pursuing his claim on any level other than innocent
misrepresentation. (R 209)
Counsel is not aware of any Utah case granting relief upon this theory.
Nevertheless, there is authority indicating that such a theory may provide relief in an
appropriate case. See Restatement, Second, Torts §552C. Under the rule as set out in the
Restatement, the elements of a claim of innocent misrepresentation are comparable to the
elements of a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation with the notable absence of the element
of scienter/recklessness. See generally. Restatement, Second, Torts §552C, comment a.1
Under any theory of misrepresentation there must be a representation. The
record fails to disclose that Lowe made any representation regarding the value of the subject
property. He merely stated his asking price. (R 206-207)

The Restatement rule relating to innocent misrepresentation is a rule of strict liability and has been
"confined to sale, rental, or exchange transactions between the plaintiff and the defendant." Restatement,
Second, Torts §552C comment c. It is comparable to the doctrine of mutual mistake which provides relief
under principles of contract law.
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Representations Regarding Value
Evei

:i

statement

representation, as a general rule,

representations regarding value are not actionable but are regarded as mere expressions of
opinion or "trader's talk11 involving matter of judgment and estimation as to which men may
differ. Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1990). The value of property
is subjective. It is a matter of opinion. Id. at 513, fti.3.
In Wright, this ^

vd:

We conclude our discussion of the fraud issue with the observation that
while the
law provides reasonable protection to purchasers against
fraud and deceit[,] . . . it does not go to the romantic
length of offering indemnity against the adverse
consequences of folly and indolence or a careless
indifference to information which would enlighten the
purchaser as to the truth or falsity of the seller's
assertions as to value
[Citation omitted.] The record does not disclose any reason, other
than his own blind reliance upon Wright's representations, why
Humphries chose to formalize the transaction prior - at least as he
recalled — to even viewing the property, much less making independent
inquiry or obtaining his own appraisal. "It is reasonable to expect that
. . . vendors would attach the highest possible value to the property.
Indeed, it would be unreasonable to assume otherwise, and purchasers
who rely on such representations proceed at their own risk." [Citation
omitted.] [Emphasis added.]
Id. at 514.

Reasonable Reliance upon Opinion of Adverse Party
Knox contends that Lowe was in possession of "special knowledge" regarding
the property. This was allegedly information relating to the status of financing for a roadway
which would provide
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perpetually enjoyed from the property.
Lowe shared this information with Knox during contract negotiations. (R 207208) While the new roadway was eventually constructed, the improvement was completed
about two years later than the parties anticipated at the time of entering into the contract.2
(R 207-213, 218-220, 234-235)
Knox apparently alleges that "Lowe claimed special knowledge about the
property11 in order to suggest that he was justified in relying upon Lowe's "opinion" regarding
value. See Restatement, Second, Torts §542. Such an argument must fail for two reasons:
Lowe's establishment of an asking price did not constitute an opinion and knowledge which
is in the possession of both parties is not "special".
Reliance upon the opinion of an adverse party is reasonable only when the
party offering it suggests that as a result of his expertise he is in a superior position to
formulate an opinion. In such a case the person offering the opinion suggests that the other
party should rely on his judgment because he enjoys a vantage from which the other party
cannot view the matter. See, Restatement, Second, §Torts §542, comments d and f.
In the instant case we are talking about mere information — information which
Lowe shared with Knox - information which was available to Knox in making his own
judgment. Nothing here relieved Knox of the duty to make reasonable inquiry. He relied

When it became apparent that the construction of the road would be delayed, Knox approached Lowe
and obtained a concession from Lowe who extended the trust deed note for a period of two years. (R 211-213,
219-220, 234-235) His deposition makes it clear that he has waived any claim which he could have asserted
by reason of any misrepresentation in connection with the timetable for the construction of the roadway and/or
the view from the property. (R 209-213, 218-220) Knox enjoyed the full benefit of that compromise by
obtaining an additional two years within which to discharge the subject obligation. Furthermore, Knox
concedes that he makes no claim against Lowe based upon these items. (R 209-212, 220)
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on his own judgment.
Ck\i

>v>i v*;-

misrepresentation:

fraudulent, negligent, or innocent.
POIN r *
KNOX FAILED TO RESIST LOWE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
WITH
EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING
HIS
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.
On a procedural level, the district court could have reached the same result
because

KJIUX

failed 1 : resist Lowe: s motion for summary judgment ,„;„ any evidence

indicating that at the time of the subject sale the property was worth less than he contracted
to pay, 3
L o w e m a d e out every element of his d a r which w e r e n o t controverted in Knox' answer. In

OKUM

'

allegations :: f h is complaint

to resist t h e motion for summary

judgment, Knox n e e d e d to pro\ ideevi-ii : ^ • i i-i^ : ifnt * »t ix

ii'tVpv

n.; »; •. .. r ,'*

do. H e merely r e h e d on his verified a m e n d e d answer a n d counterclaim wherein h e m a d e
finind/ithinlrss i illegal Minis ifgariliiiy III

ilini

ill lln pinpeil > ini tin hit" nil Mile.

In T h o r n o c k v. Cook. 604 P.2d 934 ( U t a h 1979), t h e defendant defended on
fiii" h;iM'i lli.li lit"! si}»iii«iniiij I ill iln " 'iiiiiiiii i i titvtii was obtained u n d e r duress. 'In affirming a
summary j u d g m e n t in favor of the plaintiff, t h e U t a h S u p r e m e Court noted: "The defendant
euuttot i d y iijuiii 41M " w r e allegations m v/^uia^ ,,i i.^i pleadings t o avoid a summary
j u d g m e n t b u t must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, Rule

Knox claims that Lowe never denied Knox' allegation thai the subject property was worth only $52,000
when Knox purchased it. See Appellant's Brief at 10-11. Page 76 and pages 93-94 of the record clearly
indicate that he is in error.
9

56(a), U.R.C.P." 14 at 936. See also Franklin Financial v. New Empire Develop. Co., 659
P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983) ("the opponent of a motion, once a prima facie case for summary
judgment has been made, must file responsive affidavits raising factual issues, or risk the trial
court's conclusion that there are no factual issues").
The district court could have reached the same result based on Knox' failure
to resist the motion for summary judgment with evidence supporting his claim of
misrepresentation.
POINT III
KNOX' CLAIM OF MISREPRESENTATION IS BARRED BY
OPERATION OF U.C.A. §78-12-26(3).
Knox contends that there is a question of fact regarding whether or not the
receipt of Miller's letter of opinion should have put him upon further inquiry. Indeed, the
district court's legal conclusion suggests that Knox' failure to make further inquiry was the
basis of the court's conclusion that the statute of limitations had run.
Section 78-12-26(3), U.C.A. 1953, provides that an action for fraud or mistake
must be commenced within three years "except that the cause of action in such a case does
not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistake."
In McConkie v. Hartman. 529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court
held that the statute of limitations begins to run when the aggrieved party has "full
opportunity1' to discover the alleged fraud or mistake and fails to make "reasonable inquiry".
In Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of CaL 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987), this
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Court held that the statute of limitations may begin to run even where the complaining party
does not have actual notic. . : me alleged iiuutl Id. M 1 IK'i

"When: llie aggrieved party

has possession of 01 access to the facts giving rise to the claim of fraudulent
misrepresentation, the statute begins to run.
After purchasing the subject residence, Knox retained a third party whose sole
charge was to provide Knox with an opinion regarding the fair market value of the subject
propei ty The • scop 2 ::: f Miller's assignn 11

'

. n *> M 11 »»

l

' those factors

which may have had an impact upon the value of the property.
Since 1 ' ah le is si lbjective and a matter of opinion Knox 1 etained someone \i ho,
as the result of his training and experience, should have been in a better position to judge
Line v a 11 u * i » l L I n " [ ) 1C) ( n " 1 i)' 1 i mi 1111 mi mi "i v 11 1 1, • 111111 1 I \ 111 J \ u 1 I 1 J \\\ . I 1" 11 u i 11 y t » h 1 a 1111 e 1 i 11 In

i () 111 in 1111 111

an independent party, Knox elected to rely upon that opinion and dealt with the property
accordingly. Indeed, instead of seeking to avoid the transaction, Knox negotiated a two-year
extension of the trust deed note. (R 219-220) He negotiated the sale of time-share interests
in the subject property at a substantial profit, ultimately sold the property to a third party
and then repurchased it from that third party. (R 238-243)
In May 1986, Knox personally and/or through his agent had unobstructed
access to all of the information upon which his frai id claim is predicated Miller synthesized
this information into an opinion with which

KJIOX

was comfortable. Knox now claims that

facts, but because he became aware that someone else apparently held a differing opinion
regard 1 ui: ;i

•..-••

property.

To allow Knox to assert a claim of misrepresentation almost six years after his
own agent had concluded his investigation of the property's value would result in the
recognition of an exception which would swallow the rule. Indeed, under an exception of
such breadth, if Knox were ever able to locate someone who possessed a differing opinion
regarding the value of the property on the date of the sale, Knox could claim that he had
just then discovered the "true value" of the property and that the statute of limitations had
just begun to run.
Having chosen an independent appraiser to provide him with an opinion, Knox
should be charged with the knowledge of all facts which a reasonable investigation of the
value would have disclosed at the time Knox' agent made his investigation.
Knox' claim of misrepresentation is barred.
As a general rule, any claim which would be barred by limitations if separately
asserted is not available as a setoff or counterclaim. See Annot., 1 A.L.R. 2d 630, 634-641.
Compare Lindsay v. Woodward, 5 Utah 2d 183, 299 P.2d 619 (1956), (in suit to recover
compensation for professional services rendered, defendant's counterclaim of medical
malpractice "containing allegations relative to fraud and breach of contract" held barred).
Knox has not contended, either in the district court or on appeal, that his claim
of misrepresentation, even if barred, may be asserted defensively by way of recoupment or
setoff. Nevertheless, counsel is obliged to advise the court of a line of authority in other
jurisdictions suggesting that a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, although barred by the
statute of limitations, may be asserted defensively in an action to recover the purchase price
of property where the sale was induced by actual fraud. See Annot. 1 A.L.R.2d 630, 680-
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684.

assertion of a claim of innocent misrepresentation or mutual mistake where such claim is
barred by the statute of limitations.
CONCLUSION
Bast

'^;%' n

uoiHi.

•'

.-.-..

order and judgment should be affirmed and the matter should be remanded to the district
court

instructi......

, jtermine and assess against Kno: i: si ich costs and attoi ney's fees

as Lowe has reasonably incurred on appeal
RESPEC I FIJI I ,Y SUBMITTED this _____ day of March, 1993.

/6/
Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Appellee
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